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12.1  Introduction 
Governments today are under substantial pressure to subsidize par- 
ticular industries or firms within industries. There is a natural desire 
to maintain employment, to improve economic development in partic- 
ular regions, and to increase exports. It is often hard to resist the pleas 
of an ailing industry for help while at the other end of the spectrum, 
governments are tempted to intervene for the purpose of giving do- 
mestic firms a bigger role in industries that develop new technologies 
and have a promise of creating future wealth. 
Although a subsidy is generally beneficial to the industry concerned, 
in most cases it does not benefit the country as a whole. The cost to 
taxpayers usually more than outweighs the gains to workers and firms 
who receive the subsidy.  For example, there can be no national gain 
from the subsidization  of a competitive industry such as agriculture 
except to the extent that maintenance of a way of life is given heavy 
weight or that regional effects are considered very important. Never- 
theless, a national gain is possible from subsidies to  firms facing foreign 
competition in imperfectly competitive industries. Such industries nor- 
mally consist of only a few firms earning high profits because of entry 
barriers arising from substantial capital or research and development 
requirements that lead to economies of scale. 
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Subsidies that increase exports in these imperfectly competitive in- 
dustries can increase profits by more than the subsidy payment and 
thereby yield a national gain at the expense of foreign firms.' Strategic 
profit-shifting subsidy policies of this type change the competitive po- 
sition of domestic firms relative to foreign firms in world markets. Of 
course strategic use of subsidies to increase exports may instead reduce 
national welfare even in imperfectly competitive industries. This de- 
pends on the nature of interfirm rivalry.2 Lobbying efforts by firms and 
workers also play a major role in explaining the existence of  subsidy 
practices. Nevertheless most developed economies have been willing 
on occasion to target certain businesses, for example, in  the aircraft 
and computer industries, in the hope that this would give them a strong 
future position in a profitable industry. As a percentage of Gross Na- 
tional  Product,  public  assistance to enterprises, including grants to 
public and private enterprise and assistance to private capital forma- 
tion, has been estimated at 0.4  percent in the United States, 3.3 percent 
in France, and 2.7  percent in Italy in  1976 (Morici and Megna  1983, 
71). 
Whatever the motive behind  the policy, subsidies that  encourage 
exports also tend to reduce the sales and profits of rival unsubsidized 
firms. Other producing nations therefore naturally view such policies 
as unfair competition in  world trade. That targeted subsidies to par- 
ticular industries can be harmful to firms in other countries has been 
widely recognized. Indeed, the countervailing duty provisions of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were developed as a 
response to such concerns. 
These countervailing duty provisions have been widely used.  For 
example, the European Community (EC) initiated 13  1 antidumping and 
antisubsidy investigations between 1980 and 1982, and definitive duties 
were imposed in 21  cases over this three-year period (U.S.I.T.C.  1984, 
25). 
The appropriateness of the method of calculating countervailing du- 
ties under GATT rules has become an important issue in international 
relations. Thus there has at times been disagreement between the United 
States and the European Community over the application of particular 
measures. Despite this, there has been very little theoretical analysis 
of the proper method for determining countervailing duties, especially 
in  the context of  international rivalry  between  firms in  imperfectly 
competitive ind~stries.~ 
This paper examines certain aspects of this question in the light of 
recent developments in the theory of industrial organization and trade. 
Particular attention is  paid to the results derived in  Spencer (1988). 
One key issue analyzed is whether the countervailing duty levels cal- 
culated under GATT rules are always sufficient to prevent a subsidy 315  Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies 
from causing harm to firms in the importing country. Allowance is made 
for the possibility  of economies of scale arising from the high capital 
requirements commonly associated with imperfect competition. Many 
results, however,  also apply to pure competition. Assuming the best 
conditions in which duties are applied in a swift and sure way, a second 
issue considered is whether countervailing duty levels will always be 
sufficient to deter governments from subsidy policies based on profit- 
shifting motives. 
An important implication of the analysis is that the type of subsidy 
payment and the use to which  the subsidy is put can be crucial  in 
determining the appropriate countervailing duty level. For example, a 
subsidy tied to the purchase of new capital equipment can have very 
different implications from a subsidy that is given to pay off past debts. 
A higher countervailing duty level is required to offset harmful effects 
on rival firms in the former than in the latter case. Indeed, under some 
circumstances, subsidies used to  pay off past debts may have very little 
impact on the sales and profits of unsubsidized producers. 
Section 12.2 contains some of the relevant provisions of the GATT. 
This is followed in section 12.3 by a discussion of the main rationales 
for countervailing duty measures. Section 12.4 introduces the question 
of whether the countervailing duty levels calculated under the GATT 
rules are likely to be appropriate in the light of the rationales of section 
12.3. Section 12.5 considers this question more specifically using dif- 
ferent types of interest rate subsidies as examples. Grants, equity in- 
fusions, and R & D subsidies are also discussed. Finally, section 12.6 
contains concluding remarks. 
12.2  Countervailing Duty Laws 
The maximum countervailing duty allowed under GATT rules is lim- 
ited by the total subsidy amount or payment that is embodied in the 
imports of the country setting the duty. For example, if  an interest- 
rate subsidy amounting  to $100,000 per year is used in a plant producing 
an output worth $1,000,000 annually, then the countervailing duty is 
limited to 10 percent of the value of exports to the country imposing 
the duty.  If these exports, worth say $500,000 are priced at $10 per 
unit, then the maximum allowable duty is $1 per unit implying a max- 
imum tariff revenue of $50,000. 
On this point Article VI:3 of the GATT  state^:^ 
No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory 
of any contracting party in excess of an amount equal to  the estimated 
bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted, directly or in- 
directly, on the manufacture, production, or export of such product 
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to the transportation of a particular  product.  The term “counter- 
vailing duty”  shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for 
the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly 
or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production, or export of any 
merchandise. 
In addition, Article 4:2 of the Subsidies Code agreed upon at the 
No countervailing duty shall be levied on any imported product in 
excess of the amount of subsidy found to exist, calculated in terms 
of subsidization per unit of the subsidized and exported product. 
One of the major difficulties with the operation of the countervailing 
duty provisions of GATT is the lack of specification of the method by 
which the total  subsidy payment  should be ~alculated.~  Article 4:2, 
footnote 2 of the 1979 Tokyo agreement merely states that “[aln  un- 
derstanding  among  signatories should  be developed  setting out the 
criteria for the calculation of the amount of the subsidy.” In the absence 
of such an understanding the United States maintains that it has a “wide 
latitude” in which to determine the value of the subsidy, as long as the 
adopted methods are reasonable. 
An important issue has been the determination of the extent of the 
subsidy arising from a government loan. The U.S. practice is to use 
commercial rates as the  benchmark  to determine  the extent of  the 
subsidy. For example, if  a subsidy is targeted to a specific industry, 
the United States uses the commercial rates of  interest paid by com- 
panies in that industry if  these are available. In contrast, the EC con- 
tends that the relevant benchmark is the rate of interest at which the 
government can borrow the money. Since government rates are gen- 
erally lower than commercial rates, the Europeans claim that the United 
States is overestimating the amount of  the subsidy. Basic economic 
principles would seem, however, to indicate that in this case the U.S. 
position is the correct one. The economic advantage given to a company 
by  a government loan arises from the difference between the actual 
rate of interest paid and the opportunity cost of money to the firm (the 
rate at which the company could otherwise borrow). After all, com- 
peting firms not subject to government subsidies must use normal fi- 
nancial markets. 
It is often hard to draw the dividing line between government inter- 
vention for purely domestic purposes and those forms of intervention 
that cause harm to foreign industry. For example, some subsidies such 
as investment tax write-offs apply broadly to most domestic firms and 
are primarily part of domestic policy. Nevertheless, since they increase 
the level of capital investment, they may still have consequences for 
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 1979 states: 317.  Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies 
exports, particularly in  capital  intensive industries.  Also, capital as 
well as research and development (R & D) subsidies targeted to do- 
mestic industries that both produce for home and foreign markets may 
be important for domestic regional development purposes but can in 
addition cause injury to rival foreign producers. Indeed in imperfectly 
competitive industries with economies of  scale, these latter types of 
subsidies may be the best  means of  attempting to shift profits from 
foreign to domestic firms. Once the subsidy is incorporated into a larger 
capital base or improved production methods through R & D, a firm 
can have a long-term competitive advantage in world markets (Spencer 
1986). 
For countervailing duty  purposes  the  United  States distinguishes 
between “broad-reaching  government actions”  which are not coun- 
tervailable and actions that “preferentially”  benefit a firm or industry 
or group of industries and that could be countervailable if other criteria 
are satisfied (Shuman and Verrill  1984). For example, regional devel- 
opment grants and loans for European steel companies have been found 
to be countervailable as in the Belgian and Italian  1982  cases,6 but 
general tax incentives for capital investments have not. This distinction 
between targeted and nontargeted subsidies seems to be a reasonable 
approach. On the one hand it is important to countervail foreign sub- 
sidies that cause harm to domestic producers, but, on the other hand, 
too wide a class of  cases could  lead to an escalation of  tariffs  and 
duties. 
The United  States (along with other GATT signatory countries) is 
now committed to the use of a material injury test before countervailing 
duties can be imposed. However, prior to 1979, the U.S. did not have 
such a rule. An injury test was introduced for duty free products in 
1974 when the countervailing duty laws were expanded to cover these 
products, but it was not until 1979 that the United States agreed to use 
an injury test in all countervailing duty cases involving signatories of 
the subsidy code. 
Export subsidies on other than primary products were banned out- 
right under the original GATT articles implemented in 1948, and this 
ban was extended to minerals in the 1979 Subsidies Code.  Unfortu- 
nately, government intervention in  agricultural  products  is so wide- 
spread that it was not possible to reach agreement on these products. 
One effect of the ban on the use of export subsidies in  manufactured 
goods is to increase the incentives to use other more indirect forms of 
subsidies, such as capital grants and interest rate subsidies not specif- 
ically targeted to exports. As mentioned, these are the kinds of sub- 
sidies that may be most suitable for gaining a competitive advantage 
in industries with high capital requirements. 318  Barbara J. Spencer 
12.3  Rationales for Countervailing Duty Measures 
There would appear to be two main rationales for countervailing 
duty measures. One objective is to offset the adverse effects of a foreign 
country’s trade policies on domestic industry. The second objective is 
to deter governments from intervening with targeted subsidy policies 
in the first place. 
With respect to the first objective, subsidies that increase exports 
are very likely to hurt competing producers in the countries that import 
the subsidized goods. First, the subsidy tends to lower industry prices. 
Also, the subsidized producers tend to gain sales and market shares at 
the expense of  their unsubsidized  rivals.  Therefore competing firms 
tend to suffer a loss of profits both because of fewer sales and lower 
prices for their products. However, the reduction in prices arising from 
the subsidy tends to increase consumer welfare in the countries that 
import the subsidized goods. 
Whether the foreign subsidy practice hurts the importing country as 
a  whole  depends on  how  the losses  experienced  by  producers are 
weighed against the gains to consumers. If the industry is purely com- 
petitive, in the long run after unprofitable firms have left the industry 
and laid-off workers have found new jobs, an export subsidy increases 
welfare in the importing country (for a clear explanation of this point, 
see Dixit  1985). Nevertheless, even in  this case, the short-term ad- 
justment problems arising from the loss in  sales and employment in 
the competing domestic industry may well make a countervailing policy 
seem appropriate. One consideration might be whether the actions of 
a foreign government should be allowed to significantly affect the nature 
of the domestic industrial structure, hurting some groups in the economy. 
The use of countervailing duty measures to prevent harm to rival 
producers in an importing country becomes more important if  there 
are high or above normal profits to be earned in the industry. Above 
normal profits can persist only if there are significant barriers to the 
entry of other firms. These barriers commonly arise from large sunk 
capital and R & D costs that lead to economies of scale. This type of 
production structure is often associated with an imperfectly competi- 
tive or oligopolistic industry in  which firms are aware of  their mutual 
interdependence. Each firm recognizes that its optimal choice of price 
or output is dependent on the decisions taken by its rivals. 
As indicated in the introduction, in this situation commitment by a 
government to subsidize its domestic producers in order to increase 
exports affects price and output decisions by changing the underlying 
structure of the game played between firms. The fall in prices charged 
by subsidized firms generally reduces the profits earned by rival foreign 
firms whether or not the subsidized firms earn greater profits. This can 319  Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies 
lead to a reduction in welfare in other producing nations even in the 
long  run.  If  the subsidized  good is imported by  another producing 
nation, it is possible under some circumstances for the loss in above 
normal profits to more than offset the consumer gain from lower prices. 
Also, if  both subsidized firms compete in third markets or in the sub- 
sidizing country itself, any loss in profits  represents a direct loss in 
national welfare since gains to consumers are then not relevant to the 
calculation. 
From the viewpoint of satisfying the second objective of deterring 
government intervention, it is important that the subsidizing country 
be made worse off  as a result of  its subsidy practice. One necessary 
condition in the context of imperfect competition is that the counter- 
vailing duty be sufficiently high to prevent profit-shifting subsidy pol- 
icies from being successful. That is, the profits earned by subsidized 
firms after payment of the countervailing duty should not increase by 
more than the subsidy payment, preventing any gain in overall national 
welfare. The subsidy payment would then simply act as a transfer from 
the government to the firm. However, even this level of duty may not 
be sufficient to deter many subsidy policies. For example, lobbying by 
firms and workers for their own interest is likely to be a much more 
common motivation for government intervention than any sober cal- 
culation of the likelihood of a net national gain. In order to deter the 
subsidy practice, the duty might need to be sufficiently high to prevent 
subsidized firms from enjoying any increase in profit or ability to pay 
higher wages. 
In many cases such a high level of countervailing duty might not be 
desirable. Caution is necessary in determining the size of countervailing 
duties. A duty perceived  as “unfair”  is likely to provoke further re- 
taliation which will make the situation worse. 
A second requirement for deterrence is that the countervailing duty 
be immediate and certain in its application.  Countries contemplating 
subsidies should expect swift and sure retaliation, particularly if  the 
future gain from a subsidy is uncertain. The immediate payment of a 
significant  amount of  countervailing  duty may  be more effective  in 
preventing the subsidy action than some chance that a much higher 
level of duty might be imposed in the future. 
This second requirement would seem hard to achieve given the way 
the countervailing duty cases are commonly dealt with in practice. It 
is true that the 1979 Trade Agreements Act, which implemented the 
1979 Tokyo agreement in the United States, led to more precise and 
faster investigation of cases than in the past (Shuman and Verrill 1984). 
Nevertheless, despite a determination that a subsidy practice falls un- 
der the GATT rules and is causing material injury, countervailing duties 
are often not finally  imposed. For example, in  the  1982  steel cases 320  Barbara J. Spencer 
between the United States and the European Community, negotiations 
led to imposition of a steel quota instead of a tariff. Quotas generally 
do not have as harsh an effect as tariffs on the subsidized firms. Indeed, 
in a unionized industry the prices charged by firms in  the importing 
country are likely to rise by more than they would with the same level 
of imports under a tariff. This reduces any fall in profits earned by the 
subsidized firm (Brander and Spencer 1988). Because of the nature of 
interfirm rivalry, some quotas may even increase the profits of the firm 
subject to the quota (Krishna 1984). 
Although determination of material injury is valuable in keeping the 
number of cases within reasonable bounds, it also serves to make it 
less certain that a subsidy practice will in fact be countervailed. Some 
guidance was given in the 1979 Subsidies Code on the way the injury 
test is to be interpreted. Nevertheless there remains substantial latitude 
for differences in judgment. Even within the United States, the inter- 
pretation  of the meaning of injury has at times been confusing.’  As 
Hufbauer and Erb (1984, 125) point out, the injury test could be much 
improved by making it uniform across countries and much simpler to 
In some cases, the automatic application of a previously  specified 
level of  countervailing duty might not  be  desirable even  if  it  were 
feasible. As discussed earlier, targeted subsidies can hurt the sales and 
profits of rival firms exporting to third markets or to the home market 
of  the subsidized  firms.  Any general rules  that  specify the level of 
countervailing duties to be applied in a wide variety of multiple market 
cases would likely give inadequate attention to the particular attributes 
of any one situation. In fact it would be very difficult if not impossible 
for such rules to be both comprehensive and unambiguous. If the duty 
is  seen as somewhat unfair or arbitrary,  it is very  likely to lead  to 
retaliation by the subsidizing country, perhaps on some other good. In 
this situation, negotiations covering the details of the specific case could 
be very helpful in providing a suitably tailored response. 
The use of countervailing measures to apply to multiple market sit- 
uations is difficult even in a discretionary situation. For example, in 
1985 the EC introduced a preference scheme that favored imports of 
citrus products from some Mediterranean countries over those from 
the United States. The United States responded by imposing a duty 
on the import of pasta from Europe to offset the perceived discrimi- 
natory tariff on U.S.  exports of citrus to Europe. The confrontation 
escalated further with Europe setting a tariff on the import of  U.S. 
lemons and nuts. 
Because of these difficulties with multiple market cases and for sim- 
plicity, the followng theoretical analysis of the effect of various spec- 
ifications of countervailing duty measures will be restricted to a single 
apply. 321  Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies 
market situation. One could assume that all of the subsidized good is 
exported to the country setting the countervailing duty or, alternatively, 
that subsidized firms compete with rival firms only in the home market 
of the rival firms. 
12.4  The Appropriate Level of Countervailing Duties 
Given our assumption that competition occurs only in the country 
imposing the duty, a countervailing duty will be just sufficient to prevent 
a foreign subsidy from causing harm to industry in the importing coun- 
try if  the combined effect of the subsidy and tariff is to leave the level 
of exports to that country unchanged. With the same level of imports, 
the sales and profits of the rival firms in the importing country should 
remain the same. The profit-maximizing levels of output of the subsi- 
dized firms will be unchanged as long as their marginal costs are un- 
affected.  For  convenience  this  level  of  countervailing duty  will  be 
referred to as an “equal exports tariff.” 
Dejnition: An equal exports tariff serves to just offset the effect of 
a foreign subsidy on the marginal costs of the subsidized firms. The 
level of exports to the country imposing the duty will be unchanged. 
As discussed in section 12.2, the maximum countervailing duty level 
allowed under the GATT code is a tariff equal to the subsidy per unit 
of exports to the country imposing the duty. Under this scheme the 
maximum tariff revenue is equal to the total subsidy payment that is 
embodied in these exports. Again for convenience, this maximum level 
of duty will be referred to as an “equal payment tariff.” 
Dejinition: An equal payment  tariff is a tariff equal to the subsidy 
per unit of  exports to the country imposing the duty. 
For the purpose of the analysis it is assumed that it is possible to 
obtain reasonably accurate estimates of  the subsidy amount and the 
output to which the subsidy should be attributed. Although there can 
be substantial difficulties with such estimates and disputes may arise 
(see section 12.2), it is necessary first to understand the effects of an 
equal payment tariff in circumstances where it can be clearly calculated, 
before addressing the complications. 
One of  the main issues of  this paper is the question of the circum- 
stances under which an equal payment tariff will be sufficient to prevent 
a subsidy from causing harm to firms in the importing country. In other 
words, we need to determine the conditions that underlie the relation- 
ship between an equal payment tariff and an equal exports tariff. If an 
equal payment tariff is the same as an equal exports tariff, then it will 
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from reducing the levels of output and profits of firms in the importing 
country. 
In the case of  a direct subsidy per unit of  exports, retaliation with 
an equal payment tariff would lead to no net change in marginal costs. 
For example, suppose that initially 1,000 units of a good are exported 
at a price of $2 per unit and that the good is then subsidized at the rate 
of  $1  per unit of exports, reducing marginal costs by  $1.  The equal 
payment tariff would then also be $1 per unit, which is just sufficient 
to offset the $1 fall in marginal costs. There would be no change in the 
profit-maximizing level of exports, ensuring that an equal payment tariff 
is the same as an equal exports tariff in this case. This result applies 
regardless of whether the industry is purely competitive or monopo- 
listic. A subsidy to output or to total sales can always be exactly offset 
by a tax of the same type that raises the same total revenue. 
An additional issue is whether in imperfectly competitive industries, 
retaliation with an equal payment tariff is always sufficient to make 
subsidization for profit-shifting purposes ineffective, thus  helping to 
deter the subsidy behavior. In the case of a direct subsidy per unit of 
exports, an equal payment tariff also satisfies this objective. Returning 
to our example, if an export subsidy of $1 per unit is countervailed by 
a tariff equal to $1  per unit, then whether or not the industry is im- 
perfectly competitive, subsidized firms will experience no net change 
in their level of  profits. Automatic and immediate application of  such 
a countervailing duty would leave firms with no incentive to lobby for 
export subsidies.  Furthermore, the  subsidizing country as a whole 
would be worse off by the amount of tariff revenue paid as duty. As 
indicated in section  12.2, export subsidies, except for some primary 
products, are outlawed under the GATT. However, for those cases that 
do  occur, imposition of the maximum level of duty allowed under GATT 
rules would appear to be the appropriate response. 
The appropriateness of  an equal payment tariff becomes much more 
difficult to ascertain in the case of more complex  subsidies such as 
interest-rate subsidies or grants towards the initial establishment of a 
firm or for later expansion of plant and equipment. For reasons dis- 
cussed in section 12.2, except for agricultural products, these types of 
subsidies are much more common and therefore rather more important 
for practical policy decision making than are simple export subsidies. 
Some theoretical results applying to interest-rate subsidies and grants 
are presented in the next section. The implications of  this theoretical 
analysis for grants, equity infusions, and R & D subsidies are also 
discussed. 
The key insight behind the analysis is that the appropriateness of 
countervailing policies is very much dependent on the type of subsidy 
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countries by various production subsidies to firms is affected by the 
use that is made of the subsidy. In other words, the nature of the subsidy 
can be crucial in determining the level of countervailing duty that should 
be applied. We  first examine the implications of a subsidy to existing 
capital services. 
12.5  Subsidies to Capital 
12.5.1 
Interest-rate subsidies that apply at least in part to existing capital 
services are rather common. One example is the refinancing of some 
of the existing loans of a company at government subsidized rates. It 
is important to know whether such subsidies cause harm to competing 
foreign producers and therefore whether they warrant the use of coun- 
tervailing measures. 
It is useful first to consider the case in which capital markets are 
perfect and the firm is not in severe financial difficulty, In this situation 
a subsidy to existing loans will not change the price of  capital to the 
firm so it will not affect the firm’s private incentives to purchase new 
capital equipment with its own or borrowed funds. This type of subsidy 
will therefore not have any significant effect on marginal cost or on the 
level  of  exports. The sales and profits of  rival producers  would be 
unaffected. 
It is sometimes argued that the designation of subsidy funds to reduce 
the cost of old debt will have the same effect as a subsidy to new capital 
equipment because it releases funds of the firm that can now be used 
for expansion. Since firms are normally able to borrow to make any 
profitable capital investments, this argument could be relevant only if 
there are substantial imperfections in the capital market, or if the firm 
is on the verge of bankruptcy. If the firm is in difficulty but considered 
likely to survive, a subsidy to pay off old debts would at most allow 
the firm to borrow at more favorable interest rates. This would have 
only a small secondary effect on the extent of expansion. 
Capital market imperfections may lead to a situation in which the 
internal funds of  a corporation have a substantially lower opportunity 
cost than the cost of obtaining a new outside loan. For example, prob- 
lems arising from asymmetric information about the profitability of the 
firm’s proposed investments could lead to a substantial premium on 
the interest rate charged on new borrowings relative to the return the 
firm could receive if  it lent its own funds through the capital market. 
In this case, if  the firm has a shortage of internal funds, government 
subsidization of some of its existing loans could then bring about an 
expansion of output, thereby causing harm to foreign producers.8 Al- 
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though this argument has validity, it by no means warrants treating 
subsidies to existing  capital  services the same as subsidies for the 
purchase of new capital equipment that will  have a direct effect on 
output. Even if  capital markets are imperfect in this way, the extent 
of  the expansion arising from  subsidies to existing  loans would  be 
limited by the number of worthwhile projects at the lower opportunity 
cost of the firm’s internal funds but not at the higher rate on borrowed 
funds. The extent to which this argument is significant in practice would 
need to be examined in the context of the particular firm and industry. 
Since, with perfect capital markets, a subsidy to existing capital has 
no effect on the firm’s exports, the use of any tariff to countervail the 
subsidy will  cause a net increase in the firm’s marginal cost and an 
overall reduction in exports. In these circumstances imposition of an 
equal payment tariff is likely to be viewed as a rather harsh penalty. 
If  capital markets are imperfect, some increase in  exports might be 
expected, but the combined effect of the subsidy and equal payment 
tariff is almost certain to reduce exports. In other words, whether or 
not capital markets are perfect, an equal payment tariff is likely to be 
more than  sufficient to prevent  harm to producers  in  the importing 
country. Indeed, competing firms would likely face less competition 
than they did prior to the subsidy. 
If, however, a subsidy to existing capital services is not countervailed 
or is countervailed only at the level required to maintain exports con- 
stant (in the case of imperfect capital markets), the subsidized firm is 
still likely to reap a net  increase in profit from the subsidy.  Conse- 
quently, if countervailing measures are partly used to discourage such 
subsidies, a higher duty level may be warranted to make it unprofitable 
for firms to lobby for subsidies. Nevertheless the extent to which coun- 
tervailing  duties are used  for this purpose needs to be viewed with 
caution. A  duty  level  that  substantially reduces  the exports of  the 
subsidized firm could result in a significant risk of  further retaliation 
and escalation of  protectionist measures. 
It is again worth emphasizing the importance of the nature of  the 
subsidy for the appropriateness of  countervailing measures. The im- 
plications of an interest-rate subsidy designated for existing loans differ 
sharply from the implications of a direct subsidy to exports. In this 
latter case (see section 12.4), an equal payment tariff is just sufficient 
to maintain both the level of  exports and the profits of the subsidized 
firms at their presubsidy levels. 
Some additional issues arise with respect to loans to uncreditworthy 
companies. Since normal market rates of  interest no longer apply to 
such firms, the practice of the U.S.  government of adding a substantial 
risk premium to the benchmark rate to determine the amount of subsidy 
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of whether such loans in fact cause any harm to rival producers in 
other countries. After all, if the loan is of the general kind used mostly 
to pay off old debts, no increase in exports would be expected. On the 
other side, it is argued that a general loan in this situation could have 
a major strategic effect in preventing the firm from going bankrupt. In 
the event of  bankruptcy  output would drop to zero, allowing other 
firms to improve their market share and profitability. The existence of 
the loan prevents this favorable outcome for rival firms. 
This latter argument would seem to overstate the case. At least some 
of the assets of a bankrupt firm are usually purchased by other firms. 
These firms are not responsible for the burdensome debts that caused 
the bankruptcy, and it is likely to be in  their interest to continue to 
produce output in the plants taken over from the bankrupt firm. Only 
in the extreme case when all of the plants of the bankrupt firm remain 
permanently closed  would exports fall to zero. It seems, therefore, 
that there is no strong case for loans to companies near bankruptcy to 
be countervailed in a tougher manner than loans to creditworthy com- 
panies (apart from the previously  mentioned difference in the calcu- 
lation of the subsidy). In either case, if the loan is mostly used to reduce 
interest payments on existing capital assets, an equal payment tariff is 
likely to reduce  exports below  the level  that would  have occurred 
without the loan, allowing a gain to producers in the importing country. 
The question as to whether a subsidy should be countervailed so as 
to prevent harm to foreign producers is of course separate from the 
question  as to whether  the use  of  targeted  subsidies is in any  way 
beneficial to the subsidizing country or to the world as a whole. Often 
subsidies to uncreditworthy companies merely serve to perpetuate in- 
efficient firms and industries and therefore clearly reduce the welfare 
of  the  subsidizing country  (and  world welfare). In  such a case the 
subsidy is ineffective in reducing marginal costs. This means that no 
increase in exports would be expected. The profits of competing foreign 
producers would be unchanged. Such subsidies are a waste of resources 
but it does not follow that a countervailing tariff is then justified except 
perhaps for deterrence purposes. The imposition of a tariff would add 
a further distortion to trade. 
12.5.2 
Quite commonly a subsidy may be given on condition that it be used 
for the acquisition of new plant and equipment. For example, a subsidy 
for the purposes of  modernization will  require the purchase of new 
equipment. Also, regional development subsidies often require that the 
firm build a new plant or extend its existing facilities in a particular 
region. These types of subsidies are fundamentally different from sub- 
sidies that help finance the cost of existing capital. A subsidy to new 
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plant  and  equipment gives  the firm an incentive to purchase  more 
capital than it would without  the subsidy and leads to more capital- 
intensive methods  of  production.  In  contrast,  a  subsidy to existing 
capital is essentially just a windfall gain to the firm since, under normal 
conditions, it does not affect profit-maximizing production or invest- 
ment decisions. Of course even subsidies designated for new plant and 
equipment may be partly spent on investments that the firm would have 
made anyway. The theoretical analysis presented here strictly applies 
to the purest case in which all of the subsidy is used for investments 
that would not otherwise have been undertaken. This type of subsidy 
is referred to as a subsidy to additional capital. 
Subsidies that  increase capital investments lower the marginal or 
additional cost of production and lead to an increase in  output. An 
important attribute of a subsidy confined to additional capital is that it 
achieves the same decrease in marginal cost as would the same subsidy 
per unit applied to all units of capital including both new and existing 
capital services. If a subsidy is used only for investments which other- 
wise  would  not  be  undertaken,  then  maximum  “additionality”  is 
achieved in the sense that the increase in investment (and reduction in 
marginal cost), holding output and the subsidy rate fixed, is at a max- 
imum per dollar spent by the government.’O 
This brings us to the question of  the appropriateness of  an equal 
payment tariff in this context. As discussed in the last section, in the 
case of an interest-rate subsidy to existing capital services, an equal 
payment tariff exceeds the level of duty required to prevent an increase 
in output and harm to unsubsidized producers. However, the increased 
“additionality”  arising from a subsidy designated for new plant and 
equipment can mean  that in  some circumstances  an equal payment 
tariff is insufficient to prevent  harm  to rival  firms in  the  importing 
country. This is possible because subsidies costing the same total amount 
to the government will be countervailed at the same rate, even though 
an interest-rate subsidy to additional capital is associated with a greater 
reduction in marginal cost than is an interest-rate subsidy to all existing 
capital services. 
Spencer (1988) develops some sufficient conditions under which firms 
in the importing country will  be hurt by  an interest-rate subsidy for 
the purchase of additional capital, despite the use of an equal payment 
countervailing tariff. These conditions depend on both the nature of 
the production function in a subsidized firm and the magnitude of the 
subsidy. The main factors are: 
a. the size of the interest-rate subsidy relative to the market rate of 
interest, 
b. the value of the elasticity of  substitution, between labor and capi- 
tal,” and 
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The relative size of the subsidy is a critical factor. The analysis shows 
that the smaller the interest subsidy (to additional capital) relative to 
the market rate of interest, the more likely it is that firms in the im- 
porting country will suffer despite the use of an equal payment tariff. 
Since the firm has to pay a greater proportion of the costs, a smaller 
subsidy naturally  leads to less  additional  investment.  However, the 
effectiveness of capital investments in reducing marginal costs is greater 
at lower levels of capital so that a smaller subsidy is associated with 
a larger reduction in marginal cost relative to the total subsidy payment. 
The Cobb-Douglas production function provides an interesting and 
simple illustration of the effect of the magnitude of the subsidy. Suppose 
the Cobb-Douglas production function is of the form, 
x  = AK"Lb, 
where x  = output, K  = capital, L  = labor, and A,  a, and b are con- 
stants. If  the marginal productivity of  labor is decreasing or constant 
(b 5  l), any interest-rate subsidy to additional capital that is less than 
or equal to one-third of the market rate will lead to an increase in output 
by the subsidized firms even after imposition of an equal payment tariff. 
Firms  in  the importing country  will  then  suffer  losses in  sales and 
profits.  This  result  applies  to  both  competitive  and  oligopolistic 
industries. 
Whether or not an equal payment tariff is effective in preventing 
harm to the industry in the importing country is also dependent on the 
size of  cr, the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. u is 
equal to  I  for a Cobb-Douglas  production function.  For a constant 
elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.)  production function, a lower value 
of  cr, which corresponds to a greater difficulty in substituting capital 
for labor so as to maintain the same level of output, usually increases 
the range of subsidy values for which an equal payment tariff will not 
be fully effective.'2 Low values of cr are often associated with capital- 
intensive industries that experience the economies of scale associated 
with oligopolistic market structures. On the other hand, an increase in 
the extent of economies of scale (per se) tends to reduce the range of 
subsidy values for which an equal payment tariff allows net harm to 
competing firms (Spencer 1988). The analysis allows consideration of 
both competitive industries,  which do not  have economies of  scale, 
and imperfectly competitive industries. 
Since in this context an equal payment tariff does not always satisfy 
the objective of preventing harm to firms in the importing country, the 
question arises as to its usefulness is satisfying the other main objective 
of deterring governments from the use of targeted subsidies. Even if 
an equal payment tariff allows subsidized firms to increase exports, 
these firms will often earn lower profits than in the presubsidy situation. 
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in which the combined effect of the subsidy and equal payment tariff 
is to increase profits. It is even possible in an extreme case for these 
profits to rise by more than the subsidy and tariff payment and thereby 
bring a net national gain from the subsidy practice. Such cases are not 
likely to be very important in practice, however. The usefulness of an 
equal payment tariff as a deterrent is  likely to depend mainly on a 
commitment by the importing country to countervail in an immediate 
and sure way. If there is a good chance that countervailing duties will 
not be imposed or that measures will be taken only after substantial 
delay, the incentive for firms and governments to use subsidies is not 
likely to be much affected by countervailing duties. 
Interest-rate subsidies do not always apply exclusively to the pur- 
chase of  new capital equipment even if  they are designated  for this 
purpose.  It is possible that some of the funds are used  to subsidize 
existing capital services or services the firm would have undertaken 
anyway without the subsidy. In general, a subsidy package to a firm 
is likely to include elements of both subsidies to existing capital and 
to new capital. Analysis  of the particular  case is then necessary to 
determine the proportions of the two types of subsidies. Ideally, the 
implications of each type of subsidy can then be combined in  some 
reasonable manner to determine the appropriateness of an equal pay- 
ment tariff in the particular case. 
12.5.3  Grants and Equity Infusions 
In many cases the subsidy takes the form of a grant or an equity 
infusion. For example, two Belgian steel firms, Cockerill and Sidmar, 
received grants for capital expenditures which were countervailed by 
the United States as a result of the 1982 steel case. The question arises 
as to how to determine the effectiveness of an equal payment coun- 
tervailing tariff in such cases. 
The first requirement is to understand the way in which the subsidy 
in the form of a grant or an equity infusion is calculated.'3 In the case 
of a grant, the subsidy amount is simply the grant itself. For an equity 
infusion, the initial subsidy amount is taken to be the difference be- 
tween what the government paid for a share of the company and what 
the market would have paid for a share. This can be difficult to calculate 
particularly if the company is not commercially sound. The amount of 
the subsidy associated  with  an equity infusion,  however, is always 
calculated as being no more than the subsidy associated with a grant 
of the same amount. This is reasonable, since treating the equity in- 
fusion as a grant would imply that the government expected no return 
from its equity. 
In both cases, a time discount rate is used  to spread the subsidy 
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choice of time frame is appropriate for subsidies which are tied to the 
purchase of additional capital since they will affect the level of exports 
for the life of the capital eq~ipment.’~  The estimates needed to make 
such a calculation, such as the choice of the time rate of discount and 
the length of life of the capital assets, are likely to give rise to dis- 
agreement, but this is not the focus of this paper. Having obtained the 
yearly subsidy equivalent by this method, the subsidy to exports can 
then be calculated by spreading it over export sales. 
If a grant or an equity infusion is not tied to the purchase of new 
capital, then the analysis of section 12.5.1 concerning an interest-rate 
subsidy to existing capital services applies. The subsidy is likely to 
have very little effect on the output of the subsidized firm and therefore 
an equal payment tariff will more than offset any harm to firms in the 
importing country. This would normally be the case for equity infusions. 
In  contrast,  if  the grant is tied  to capital expenditures  and if  no 
additional  matching  funds are required from  the firm, the grant,  in 
effect, is equivalent to an interest-rate subsidy equal to the full market 
rate with the constraint  that the total  subsidy not exceed the grant 
amount. Even if  such a grant were restricted to expenditures on ad- 
ditional capital only, the analysis of the previous section indicates that 
in this case an equal payment tariff is likely to exceed the level of duty 
required to keep exports ~0nstant.l~  Exports of  the subsidized firms 
will on balance fall and foreign producers will be better off. The pos- 
sibility that exports of the subsidized firm will increase generally arises 
when the subsidy to interest payments is “small.”  The proportion of 
costs covered by the subsidy is reduced to the extent that there is a 
matching  requirement that firms must contribute toward the capital 
project in order to receive the grant. If  the matching contribution is 
large, there is then the possibility that an equal payment tariff may be 
insufficient to prevent harm to rival producers in the importing country. 
12.5.4  R & D Subsidies 
It may be almost impossible to estimate the overall extent of  the 
harm done to rival firms by  some types of subsidies. For example, a 
subsidy to R & D might aid a firm in the race to develop a new product, 
allowing the firm initially to dominate the world market and reap healthy 
profits from being first. Indeed, very substantial subsidies for a partic- 
ular development project may discourage foreign unsubsidized firms 
from even entering the race. For subsidies such as these, the imposition 
of countervailing duties is not likely to be very helpful. By the time 
the subsidized firm is at the production (and export) stage, the harm 
has already been done to rival foreign firms that have withdrawn from 
the field.  Duties then  would  mainly hurt  the importing  country  by 
raising consumer prices.  Experience  shows, however, that such tar- 330  Barbara J. SDencer 
geting attempts often do not pay  off  in  net gains to the subsidizing 
country, making such policies rather expensive and therefore limited 
in their extent. 
On the other hand, many R & D subsidies are of the more pedestrian 
kind, directed, for example, to the development of cost-reducing pro- 
cesses.  Assuming  the information  arising from the R  & D remains 
private to the subsidized firms, these types of R & D subsidies generally 
have similar effects to subsidies designated for the purchase of addi- 
tional capital, and the use of countervailing duty measures is appro- 
priate.  Even if  the information is made generally  available, in  some 
instances it may only be useful to the particular firm undertaking the 
development.  Consequently countervailing duties may still be called 
for to prevent harm to imposting firms. 
12.6  Conclusion 
Various types of capital subsidies tend to be important in imperfectly 
competitive industries with economies of  scale that arise because of 
high capital requirements. This paper analyzes the implications of coun- 
tervailing these capital subsidies with an “equal payment tariff,”  the 
maximum countervailing duty allowed under GATT rules. The central 
issue explored is how the type of capital subsidy affects the ability of 
an equal payment tariff to prevent harm to firms in the importing coun- 
try. A second issue considered is whether an equal payment tariff is 
likely to be sufficiently high to make the subsidy practice unprofitable 
for both the firm and the country involved. 
Practical policymakers have made considerable efforts to determine 
the appropriate methods of calculating the total  subsidy payment in 
order to determine the equal payment tariff arising from different kinds 
of subsidies, such as grants or equity infusions. Despite this work, the 
implications of the type or nature of the subsidy payment for the ap- 
propriateness of  the level  of  countervailing duty to be  applied  has 
received very little attention. For example, although material injury to 
firms has to be proved before a countervailing duty case can go forward, 
there appears to be little attempt, at least in cases prosecuted by the 
United States, to relate the level of the countervailing duty to the extent 
of harm likely to result from the particular type of subsidy. 
Clearly no exact application of  this theory could be expected. The 
determination of the exact amount of countervailing duty that maintains 
exports constant would require detailed empirical estimates which are 
always  subject to error and are difficult to obtain.  Nevertheless  an 
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of cases according to whether a substantial duty is required or a coun- 
tervailing response is unnecessary. Sufficient information to place the 
case in one or another of these classifications could easily be achieved 
without extensive and detailed investigation. In many cases, only very 
approximate values of the various parameters of the production func- 
tion would be required. 
Nevertheless, even the minimal information necessary to place the 
subsidy case in these broad categories is often not publicly available. 
In particular, it is very difficult to make even tentative judgments on 
this question from the information on subsidy cases that is available in 
the United  States Federal  Register. For example,  according to the 
information in the Federal  Register (1982, 39,307) on the  1982  steel 
case involving the United States and Belgium, the firms Cockerill and 
Clabecq received preferential loans from the SNCI (SociCte Nationale 
de Credit a 1’Industrie) at subsidy rates of  0.025 percent  and 0.009 
percent ad valorem, respectively.16  The designated use of the loans is 
not  made  clear however.  If  the loans  were  mostly  used  to pay  off 
existing debts, then little or no countervailing action is necessary. An 
equal payment tariff would likely reduce both the exports and profits 
of the subsidized firms below presubsidy levels. Firms in the importing 
country would then enjoy an increase in sales and profits. 
On the other hand, very different conclusions could be drawn if  the 
loans were used to induce the firm to purchase additional plant and 
equipment. The analysis then requires additional information such as 
the actual proportion of  the interest  cost  that  is subsidized.  If  this 
proportion is low, an equal payment tariff may allow a net increase in 
exports, continuing the harm to firms in the importing country. Un- 
fortunately, although this information is implicit in the calculation of 
the above mentioned subsidy rates, it is not directly available. 
It is important that the effects of different types of subsidy practices 
be understood more fully. This would allow the distinctions between 
types of  subsidy practices  to be drawn more finely in assessing the 
appropriate levels of countervailing duties. There is a clear-cut cost 
from countervailing duties that are too low to prevent a subsidy from 
causing harm to firms in the importing country or that encourage lob- 
bying for the subsidy by  allowing the subsidized firms to enjoy too 
great an increase in profits. Duties set at levels that cause significant 
damage to subsidized firms relative to their presubsidy condition are, 
however, likely to cause needless difficulties in international relations. 
If a country has cause to believe that a particular duty levied by another 
country is unfair, the outcome can be an escalation of tariffs and other 
protectionist measures in both countries, a result that both countries 
would like to avoid. 332  Barbara J. Spencer 
Notes 
1. For the theoretical analysis see Spencer and Brander (1983) and Brander 
and Spencer (1985). Brander (1986), and Grossman and Richardson (1984), also 
present the idea clearly in a policy context. 
2.  For  the theoretical  analysis see Eaton and Grossman (1986). A good 
discussion of these issues is available in Grossman and Richardson (1984). 
3. Baldwin  (1980) considers the case of  a production  subsidy  to a purely 
competitive industry. If the good is both consumed domestically and exported, 
he shows that in a partial equilibrium framework a duty equal to the subsidy 
per unit of exports reduces exports (because of a lower domestic consumer 
price) relative to the presubsidy  level.  In a general equilibrium context with 
income effects, the supply curve of the export good may be backward bending 
(because of an inelastic demand for imports) and it is possible for exports to 
increase. 
4. See Hufbauer and Erb (1984) for a convenient reprinting of the main parts 
of the rules covering the subsidies code. 
5. See Federal Register (1984). 
6.  See Federal Register (1982). 
7. See Adam and Dirlam (1984) for a useful discussion of  cases. 
8. I would like to thank Geoffrey Carliner for drawing my attention to the 
implications of capital market imperfections. 
9. In the 1984 steel cases from Argentina,  the United  States used the dif- 
ference between Moody’s Aaa and Baa corporate bond rates as the measure 
of risk. See Federal Register (1984). 
10. Strictly, this statement requires that the firm is allowed to borrow enough 
at the reduced interest rate to achieve its desired level of investment. 
11. The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is the propor- 
tionate change in the capital to labor ratio for a small proportionate change in 
the rate of technical substitution between labor and capital. The rate of technical 
substitution is the amount of labor released from production when an additional 
unit of capital is added maintaining output constant. It is equal to the ratio of 
the marginal product of capital to the marginal product of  labor. 
12. Strictly, this result requires that the elasticity of labor’s share with respect 
to u is greater than -  1. ‘This holds if a greater ease of  substitution  of  labor 
for capital is associated with an increase in labor’s share. 
13. For this material, see Federal Register (1984). 
14. The United States recognizes that this choice of time frame is in general 
arbitrary.  It is used because of  the absence of a better standard method (see 
Federal Register (1984). 
15. The analysis is somewhat complicated by the maximum limit to the grant. 
16. Although in these steel cases, a quota was imposed instead of  a duty, it 
would  still be  useful  to know  the implications  of  particular levels of  duty. 
Grossman (1986) has an interesting paper concerning injury to the U.S. steel 
industry  caused by  imports. He argues that relief  under section  201  of  the 
Trade Reform Act of  1974 is not warranted for the period  1976 to 1983. 333  Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies 
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Comment  Henry Ergas 
I must confess that I have difficulty in commenting on these papers.* 
They are basically exercises in theory; and regardless of  how worth- 
while they may be in this respect, they seem of doubtful relevance to 
the practitioner. 
Let me begin with Kala Krishna’s paper. The paper provides a long 
list of characteristics of high-technology industries, but most of these 
attributes-such  as learning economies, intellectual property protec- 
tion-are  only mentioned, rather than analyzed. The core of the paper 
concentrates on the effect of network externalities, and of  the expec- 
tations to which they may give rise, on trade in high-technology prod- 
ucts. Network externalities are defined as instances in which the value 
of a product or service to a user is a function of the number of users. 
The author begins by asserting that network externalities are a com- 
mon feature of high-technology industries, but no evidence is given to 
this effect. Network externalities are, of course, significant in telecom- 
munications services, and it is in the context of this industry that the 
theory of network externalities was developed. But even in telecom- 
munications, they are of diminishing relevance as the rising demand 
for specialised services has increased the importance of dedicated or 
closed user-group networks relative to public networks; and, putting 
Henry Ergas is counsellor in the advisory unit to the secretary-general of the Organ- 
isation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, France. The views expressed 
in  this paper  are those of  the  author and  do not necessarily reflect the  views of  the 
OECD. 
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telecommunications aside, are network externalities-as  compared to 
learning economies or other supposed features of high-technology in- 
dustries-really  of  relevance to aerospace or to pharmaceuticals?  I 
would have thought they were of less significance in these latter cases 
than, to use a familiar case in the industrial organization literature, to 
the supply of spare parts for commercial vehicles-not  a particularly 
high-tech product, at least in terms of the other criteria Kala Krishna 
lists. 
Nonetheless, let us assume that these network-type externalities are 
a significant feature of high-technology industries.  If individual pro- 
ducers’ products are incompatible-that  is, the products of  the one 
cannot be used to access the network of the other-then  the producer 
with the largest network will have a clear advantage. Now, let us also 
assume that the firms involved in the industry underestimate the sig- 
nificance of, or the scope for, obtaining this advantage. If the govern- 
ment is better informed in this respect than its national producers, then 
it can assist them to expand their own network through direct or indirect 
protection, thus giving its domestic firms an edge over rivals. 
This story is, to my  mind, certainly not proved and in  significant 
parts not credible. To begin with, why would firms underestimate the 
scope for obtaining network externalities? As I understand von Weiz- 
sacker’s analysis of  switching costs, the possibility  of  locking cus- 
tomers  in  will, under a broad  range of circumstances, heighten  the 
degree of price competition for market share, to the point where po- 
tential monopoly rents are largely bid away. Practical experience also 
points in this direction: consider Xerox’s attempt to establish Ethernet 
as an industry standard for LANs; everything suggests that it over- 
estimated the degree to which the use of  Ethernet would yield advan- 
tages for XTEN. Other examples-again  drawn from  the  industries 
where Dr.  Krishna suggests network externalities are of greatest rel- 
evance-include  GE’s attempt to establish a unified standard for fac- 
tory  automation  and  AT&T’s  promotion  of  UNIX.  Surveying  the 
evidence, I find it difficult to conclude that, faced with considerable 
network  externalities,  firms underestimate  their  significance; on the 
contrary, they are likely to go for broke in trying to exploit them. 
Does this lead to the opposite extreme, where the struggle to set a 
de facto standard leads, almost naturally, to the emergence of a mo- 
nopolist, capable of  imposing significant welfare  costs on the  com- 
munity? This is, of course, conceivable in theory, and IBM’s position 
in  the early  1970s may have come close to it. But I would question 
whether such a situation could be sustained over a significant period 
of time, particularly in activities where rapid technological advance is 
constantly  generating entry opportunities. Experience  suggests that 
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earning significant rents from the incompatibility of its products, other 
firms will invest in duplicating these products, or at least in obtaining 
inter-operability with them.  Second, it is not even apparent that the 
dominant firm will seek to maintain incompatibility over time. Thus, 
there are generally constraints on the economies of scope obtainable 
even by a dominant firm. If the firm is to fully exploit complementarities 
between items in the industry’s product range, it may (and frequently 
does) find it more efficient to do so by encouraging independent firms 
to produce items compatible with its product line than by going it alone. 
This will lead it to release into the public domain some of the formerly 
proprietary elements of its interface standards-as  IBM has been pro- 
gressively doing with its products. The greater revenues arising from 
compatibility will more than outweigh the loss of any monopoly rents. 
Overall, this suggests that network externalities are not likely to be 
a significant source of market failure. But even assuming they were, 
would this create a generalized case for government intervention? 
I do not share the author’s conclusions in this respect. Let us accept 
that governments seek to maximize the revenue of their domestic sup- 
pliers at the expense of that of  foreigners; and that in doing so, the 
government (like the model in this paper) examines only the partial 
equilibrium implications of its actions (perhaps not the best approach 
to deriving prescriptive solutions). Does it really follow that govern- 
ments can do better than the firms in  an industry in identifying the 
parameters of the equation for consumers’ and producers’ response to 
network externalities? 
Every empirical study I know of on industry policy concludes that 
governments obtain much of the information about an industry’s pros- 
pects and problems from the firms in that industry.’ It is conceivable, 
1. See, among many others, Michel Bauer and Elie Cohen, Qui gouverne les groupes 
industriels?  (Paris: Editions du  Seuil,  1981); Alan Cawson,  Peter Holmes, and  Anne 
Stevens, The Interaction between Firms and the State in France: The Telecommunica- 
tions and Consumer Electronics Sectors 10-  13 December 1985 Trinity Hall, Cambridge, 
(rnimeo); Centre d’Economie Industrielle, Quelques riflexions d propos des mdcanismes 
de transfert Ptat-industrie mis en oeuvre en France et en Allemagne Centre d’Economie 
Industrielle, Les Milles, n.d. (rnimeo); Elie Cohen and Michel Bauer, Les grandes man- 
oeuvres industrielles (Pans: Pierre Belfond, 1985); Commissariat GCnCral  du Plan, Aides 
ci  I’industrie, (Paris: Commissariat GenCral  du  Plan, April  1982; Jacques Darrnon, Le 
granddPrangement:  La guerre du fPlPphone  (France: J.-C. Lattes, 1985); Franqois Dupuy 
and Jean-Claude Thoenig, Sociologie de l’administrution  franqaise. Paris: Armand Colin, 
1983; Harvey  B. Feigenbaum,  The Politics  of Public  Enterprise:  Oil  and the  French 
State. (Princeton: Princeton  University Press,  1985); P.  D. Henderson,  “Two British 
Errors: Their Probable Size and Some Possible Lessons,” Oxford Economic Papers 29 
no. 2, (July 1977); Brian Hindley, (ed.). Stare Invesrmenf Companies in Western Europe 
(London: Trade Policy Research Centre,  1983); Jean-Franqois Picard, Alain Beltran, 
and Martine Bungener, Histoire(s) de I’EDF: Comment se sont prism les dPcisions de 
1946  ci  nosjours (Paris: Bordas, 1985); J.-P. Ponssard and G. de Pouvoirville, March6 
Publique et Innovation (Paris: Economica, 1982); Michael Shanks,  Planning and Politics: 
The British Experience, 1960-76 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977); Stephen Young, 
with A. V.  Lowe, Intervention in the Mixed Economy (London: Croorn Helm, 1974). 337  Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies 
as Pierre Masse suggested in his Econornetrica article of 25 years ago, 
that by adding this information up, governments could identify external 
economies arising from the interdependence of  firms’ production de- 
cisions; but could they identify the fact that firms underestimated the 
strength of consumer response to network growth? I at least do not 
see any mechanism that would yield a probability of government failure 
lower than that of the firms themselves. 
But, once again,  let  us assume  that  such  a mechanism  could  be 
identified. Would this allow governments, by  intervening to protect 
their domestic market, to improve the competitiveness of  their  do- 
mestic firms significantly? Even putting aside questions about the im- 
pact of protection on X-efficiency, I very much doubt it. 
My  skepticism basically arises from strategic interdependence be- 
tween governments. Experience suggests that “follow-the-leader’’ be- 
havior is a dominant feature of the industry policy scene; as soon as 
one government targets an industry or technology others tend quickly 
to follow. As a result, the gains to the first mover are small. 
The recent history of videotex systems brings these propositions out. 
Clearly videotex is an area where it would be reasonable to expect 
network  externalities to be  significant; and most  European govern- 
ments  so  expected. However,  as it turns  out, professional  services 
dominate the demand for videotex,  and  these are characterized  by 
relatively limited network externalities; but the fact that each European 
government thought it could propel  its own firms forward, and that 
each imitated the protectionist moves of others, has lead to an extensive 
fragmentation of  the European market, reducing the competitiveness 
of European industry overall. 
This leads me to the following conclusions: First, I doubt whether 
network externalities are in any sense a distinctive feature of the high- 
technology industries. Second, in those cases where they are signifi- 
cant, the evidence does not lead me to believe that they will generate 
important market failures. And third, even if they did, I remain to be 
convinced that governments could do better. Overall, I am not sure 
there is a case for protecting an industry so as to achieve network 
externalities. 
There is, of course, an alternative policy government could pursue 
in dealing with network externalities, namely international standard- 
ization. This would seek to reduce the extent of the firm- or country- 
specific advantages arising from the growth of the network, which in 
turn  would  lower entry barriers  and erode the scope for monopoly 
rents. This seems like a good idea and the author suggests as much in 
her conclusion. 
I say this “seems like”  a good idea because again I am skeptical 
about how far one can go with it. I do not want to go into the sordid 
technical details, but I am sure that those who have sat through CCITT 338  Barbara J. Spencer 
meetings, or are familiar with the OSI saga, will share my caution. Bad 
will on the part of firms and governments of course plays a part in 
making international standards difficult to achieve; but it cannot be 
stressed too often that the fundamental constraint lies in the uncer- 
tainties arising from rapid technical change.2 
To conclude, my own view is that network externalities do  not usually 
provide convincing grounds for government intervention, except in the 
case of standard setting. 
Allow me to turn now to Professor Spencer’s paper on subsidies. 
This gets off to an inauspicious start when  we  are told, in  the first 
sentence, that “governments  today are under substantial pressure to 
subsidize particular  industries  or firms within  industries.”  Now, as 
many know, the dominant pressure on governments today is to reduce 
expenditure; and the search for spending cuts has led to a significant 
decline over the last two years in the classical forms of financial trans- 
fers to industry. 
Most of the action, as regards government assistance to industry, 
now lies in nonconventional instruments of financial support, such as 
mixed credits or associated financing. And an empirical analysis of the 
impact of these types of measures would be very interesting. However, 
the paper concentrates on the classical forms of subsidy to industry 
and asks how these can best be dealt with through CVD practices. 
The center of the argument seems to be that, as far as imposing CVD 
is concerned, subsidies which do not affect a firm’s output program- 
in Armen Alchian’s sense of the term-should  be distinguished from 
those that do. Financial grants for the purpose of consolidating previous 
debts would fall into the former category; subsidies targeted for the 
purchase of capital equipment into the latter. The author emphasizes 
that setting a CVD rate by prorating the subsidy over exported output 
may more than offset the impact on exports in  the first case, and be 
less than offsetting in the second. 
Now, the view that different types of subsidies may have different 
types of effects is not a new one. Over the last decade it has under- 
pinned the development of extensive EC regulations on subsidies, dis- 
torting trade  in  the EC  internal  market.  Moreover, there  is  a  long 
literature on how one measures the degree of subsidy provided, with 
many applications in Italy, the United Kingdom and France (the IAC’s 
work in Australia on this question is also rele~ant).~  This work provides 
a useful perspective on the key question faced in this paper: should 
differences between types of subsidy have an impact on CVD policy? 
2. See H. Ergas, “Information Technology Standards: The Issues,”  invited paper to 
3. See,  for example, P.  Ranci (ed.),  I Transfermenti Dallo State Alle Imprese Industriali 
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Looking back at the work done on this subject over the years, two 
views emerge.  Both of these come to conclusions quite different (in 
fact opposite) from those of the author. 
The first view, which I would label as that of the pragmatists, ques- 
tions whether the distinction between different types of transfers has 
much practical relevance. Money, once it gets into the firm, is highly 
fungible; and the case study material does not suggest that firms always 
use government funds for the purposes for which they were set aside. 
This inherent fungibility of the transfers  is heightened by the way 
capital markets respond to a government decision to subsidize. We can 
take it as a premise that the capital markets always look for credible 
signals of future government behavior. Now a robust result of political 
sociology  is that governments often find themselves  trapped into an 
escalation  of  commitment  over time.4  So that actions whereby  the 
government seems to be committing itself to underwrite the losses of 
a particular company will be seen as creating an open-ended subsidy. 
This will obviously have a major effect on the perceived riskiness of 
the company’s liabilities. As a result, a presumed once-off support to 
bad debt is likely to alter substantially the terms of a firm’s access to 
new financing. 
Capital markets, in other words, assume that once a government gets 
involved in rescuing a particular firm, it will find it difficult to let that 
firm go under. And the empirical evidence does not suggest that capital 
markets are wrong in this respect. What this means as far as financial 
markets are concerned is that the subsidized firm can, if it so wishes, 
go and raise funds for investments of  at best doubtful profitability; 
eventually, the government will make the losses good. 
This  suggests that attempts to distinguish  the practical  effects  of 
different types of subsidies may be quite misleading; and that the sim- 
plest solution is to treat them as if they were all alike. Let us nonetheless 
take the other view which has been well represented in the literature, 
which I would label as that of the reformers. This school accepts that 
different types of  subsidies can be distinguished. The key argument 
advanced by this school is that a difference should be made between 
(a) those subsidies which  will  genuinely contribute to returning  the 
subsidized firms to competitive viability,  since receipt of the subsidy 
is tied to credible restructuring measures; and (b) subsidies which merely 
go to perpetuate inefficient facilities. 
4. See, for  example,  J. G. Padioleau,  Quand  la  France  s’enferre. (Paris:  Presses 
Universitaire de France,  1981); and  more generally, B. W.  Staw, “The  Escalation  of 
Commitment to a Course of Action,” Academy ofManagement Review 6,  no. 4 (1981): 
577-87; B. W.  Hogwood and  B. G. Peters, The Pathology of Public Policy, (Oxford: 
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The premise is that governments can and do  find themselves locked 
in to subsidizing inefficient firms; and that the consequences for the 
world economy as a whole are far worse when the inefficiency is per- 
petuated indefinitely than when the subsidy serves the short-term pur- 
pose of allowing restructuring to occur. This can be tied into a more 
general argument that safeguard measures should be linked to credible 
and time-limited restructuring initiatives. 
Now, to be quite frank, I am rather skeptical about these proposals, 
which I think are an excellent idea in principle but are probably very 
difficult  to implement  in practice. Nonetheless, they strike me as at 
least as sensible  as the author’s conclusion  that we should be less 
worried  about subsidies that merely perpetuate inefficiency (e.g., by 
periodically paying off a firm’s bad debts) than about subsidies that 
would allow the firm to cut its costs and modernize its product range: 
though I repeat that I am not convinced that many of the subsidies 
which have this as their goal necessarily carry it out. 
There are many specific points in this paper that are interesting and 
others that one could query: I think the analysis of the impact of equity 
contributions and of help to firms on the verge of bankruptcy could 
especially  do with  some fleshing out. Nonetheless, I  would  like, in 
closing my comments, to return to what struck me most in  reading 
these papers but which is common to the recent theoretical literature 
merging trade and industrial  organisation: the extraordinary faith in 
the capacity of governments to obtain, accurately analyze, and then 
sensibly act upon complex technical information. Is it really plausible 
that governments can know very  much  about the scope of reaction 
functions? Do we really believe that a government in country A can 
find out whether a subsidy provided by country B has mainly gone to 
consolidate bad debts or has served to expand production capacity, 
and if so, what the relevant shape of the subsidized firm’s production 
function is? 
This is  not a question of faith.  Innumerable studies exist of how 
governments obtain and use information;  and there are many good case 
studies of industry policy decision making. To  my mind, the greatest 
weakness of recent work on trade policy in oligopolistic environments 
is that it does not treat the empirical material seriously. We easily end 
up with what Demsetz termed “Nirvana economics”-we  compare a 
situation with obvious flaws, with one where no flaws are presumed to 
exist. 
This is doubly serious because this literature operates in the world 
of imperfect competition-where  game-theoretical  models, given the 
right parameterization, can generate virtually any outcome. Close at- 
tention to the empirical literature is indispensable for distinguishing 
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alism, there is a great risk that policy makers-who  will rarely follow 
the full intricacies of the assumptions-will  be misled. 
Comment  Harry Flam 
Kala Krishna’s paper* extends two existing models: (1) the Brander- 
Spencer profit-shifting model, by introducing network externalities and 
expectations on network externalities, and (2) the model of multimarket 
oligopoly with network externalities, by placing it in an international 
framework. The basic idea in these models is that by taxing or subsi- 
dizing domestic production (sales) a government can increase foreign 
demand and thereby profits of domestic firms in the case when domestic 
firms  have  incorrect conjectures about the competitive response of 
foreign firms and/or about the effects of their own actions on network 
externalities. 
Krishna argues that these models are particularly relevant for high- 
tech goods because (1) network externalities  are “significantly greater” 
in  high-tech goods  since they often are information related, and (2) 
expectations about network size are “very important” in determining 
demand for these goods. It is true that some new goods that are in- 
formation related do  have substantial  direct network externalities: PC’s 
on networks, teletex, telefax.  However,  I  am uncertain  as to how 
general  are direct network externalities in high-tech  industries, and 
how much more important they are than in other industries. I suspect 
that they are not very important overall, although very important in 
some cases, such as  the examples  just given. (One example of important 
direct network externalities in a definitely non-high-tech  market is the 
market for certain kinds of toys, such as Star Wars-type  figures. Here 
it seems important for the consumers that their friends have the same 
kind  of figures, e.g.,  Star Wars or Masters of the Universe, because 
they get enjoyment out of being able to talk about their figures with 
each other.) Moreover, all examples of a high-tech  nature that I can 
think of  involve markets where variants are compatible, which is im- 
portant in the context of Krishna’s  models, because whether or not 
goods are compatible determines the kind and extent of optimal poli- 
cies, and in particular diminishes the scope for profit shifting. As for 
indirect network externalities, e.g., repair service availability or avail- 
ability of complementary goods such as films for video recorders, I 
Harry Flam is an associate professor of economics at  the Institute for International 
*Chapter  11 in this volume. 
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suspect that high-tech goods are not very different from many other 
goods, such as the household durables mentioned by Krishna. 
There exist some striking examples of  how important expectations 
about network  size  can  be  for demand  for particular  variants  of  a 
product: the Macintosh and the IBM PC, and VHS and Sony’s Beta 
in the video market. I would argue that there are few examples of  this 
kind of competition between incompatible variants (I cannot think of 
more examples). What we have seen in the PC and video markets are 
one-shot battles for an industry standard. Once a standard is established 
there seems to develop fierce competition among compatible products. 
(Krishna raises the question of choice of standard in  the concluding 
section.) I would argue that compatibility is the rule. 
In conclusion, I am less convinced than Krishna that (1) network 
externalities are significantly greater in high-tech industries in general, 
and (2) expectations about network externalities are very important in 
these industries in general. To  be convinced I need more than a few 
good examples. In any case I think that compatibility is the rule, which 
means that there is less scope for profit shifting. 
One feature of  the kind of  models  that  Krishna employs is their 
sensitivity to choice of strategic interaction and choice of parameters. 
Let me give some examples: 
1. In  section  11.2 when  there are no distortions in  expectations  on 
network size but the usual Cournot distortion about the rival’s re- 
sponse, i.e., that the rival will keep his output constant when in fact 
he will decrease his output in response to an own output increase, 
incompatibility calls for a subsidy to the domestic firm, while com- 
patibility may call for a tax as an optimal policy. In the former case 
expectations are too pessimistic, and in the latter case they are too 
optimistic, if the complementary network effect dominates the out- 
put response effect. This case demonstrates that it may be crucial 
whether or not goods are complementary, which may not be easy 
to determine in all cases. 
2. The Cournot assumption is maintained throughout. It is known from 
Eaton and Grossman that if competition is in prices instead of quan- 
tities, the optimal policy is reversed. 
3.  It is  assumed that  the government knows the firm’s conjectures 
about the rival firm’s response, and also knows the actual response 
of the rival firm ex ante. These are strong assumptions. In the stan- 
dard case, when the firm conjectures zero response and the actual 
output response is negative, it is socially optimal to subsidize do- 
mestic production. If  instead the firm knows that the government 
will  subsidize when it thinks that the firm is too pessimistic, and 
knows what the actual response of the rival firm will be, is it then 
not in the interest of the domestic firm to lie about its conjectures? 343  Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies 
The firm maximizes profits inclusive of subsidies. (This should be 
investigated.) 
These models are partial equilibrium models. They therefore by as- 
sumption exclude intersectoral interactions which may diminish or even 
reverse an argument for a particular  policy. For example, costs are 
assumed to be given and constant. If the high-tech industry in question 
employs a scarce resource, such as electronics engineers, its output 
will affect input prices and the profit calculation. Expansion may not 
be desirable because input prices rise too much. Another possibility is 
that there are several industries with pure profits and production ex- 
clusively for exports, and that the increased profits of one industry 
imply a larger decrease in profits for the other industries. 
Kala Krishna writes at the end of section 11.3 that her demonstration 
that it is possible to shift profits away from foreign firms by subsidizing 
domestic sales should not be taken as a call for subsidization. The 
reason is that it is unlikely that subsidization by one government will 
go unanswered by other governments, i.e., retaliation must be taken 
into account. If it is, there is really no scope for profit-shifting policies 
of the Brander-Spencer type. 
The purpose of these comments is to point out the fragile nature of 
the arguments for profit-shifting policies. It is only fair to say in con- 
clusion that many of my objections are contained in Krishna’s paper, 
although one would wish that they were stressed somewhat more. 
The aims of  Barbara Spencer’s paper* are to determine if  counter- 
vailing duty levels permitted under the GATT are always sufficient to 
(1) prevent  a subsidy from  causing harm  to firms in  the importing 
country, and  (2) deter governments from  subsidy  policies  based  on 
profit-shifting motives. These questions are very important for trade 
policy as it is practiced, and have been neglected in theoretical research. 
Spencer’s analysis, together with related work of hers, is therefore, to 
the best of my knowledge, a pioneering contribution. The general point 
reached by the analysis is that the appropriate countervailing duty level 
depends on the type of subsidy and the way it is used. 
Spencer states that  subsidization of production or exports by one 
country will affect other countries’ welfare by (1) increasing consumer 
surplus, (2) giving rise to adjustment costs, and (3) shifting pure profits 
to the firms of the subsidizing country. The first effect is positive, the 
second and third negative. 
Most of the analysis focuses on the third effect; in the simple case 
considered for analytical convenience, a country will be hurt by sub- 
sidized imports because of  lower prices and decreased sales for its 
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domestic firms, whose profits decreased. The relevance of the analysis 
depends on how prevalent industries with supernormal profits are, and 
how prevalent subsidies to these industries are. Consider a rough clas- 
sification of subsidized industries as follows: (1) high-tech (electronics, 
aerospace, genetic engineering), (2) industries in  depressed regions, 
and (3) senescent industries (steel, textiles). Are pure profits prevalent 
in  these three categories? Spencer, herself, states that in the case of 
targeted research and development (R & D) subsidies, which are di- 
rected mostly toward the first category, targeting often does not pay 
off to the subsidizing country and, therefore, is limited in actual prac- 
tice. My guess is that in terms of total value, most subsidies to high- 
tech industries are nontargeted, an example is favorable tax treatment 
for R  & D expenditures, and  therefore  not  liable to countervailing 
duties. As for the second category of industries, which presumably is 
a mixture of different types of industries, it is impossible to say anything 
definite without having some data.  The third  category of  industries 
consists of declining firms; if anything, they exhibit subnormal profits. 
If  a country  subsidizes this category of industries  so that the same 
category is diminished in another country, the other country is probably 
made better off since consumer surplus is increased, and resources can 
be allocated to more productive activities without too high adjustment 
costs. My  point is that perhaps the category of  subsidized industries 
with supernormal profits is really insignificant, and that instead indus- 
tries with subnormal profits are dominant. Spencer’s analysis is still 
valid but less relevant if  my presumptions are correct. 
As a basis for later discussion, Spencer first establishes the following 
theorem (section 12.4): “A  subsidy to output or to total sales can always 
be exactly offset by a tax of the same type which raises the same total 
revenue.” Consider two cases of offsetting taxes (tariffs), in which the 
effect  of  the  offsetting  tax  (tariff) on exports from  the  subsidizing 
country is the same in both cases. In the first case exports are subsi- 
dized by 10 percent. A tariff of  10 percent will leave market shares and 
prices in the importing country constant as well as profits ofthe sub- 
sidized exporringfirrn. The subsidizing country will not shift profits to 
itself and will be worse off by the amount of the tariff. In the second 
case output is subsidized, not exports. A 10 percent tariff will again 
leave market shares and prices in  the importing country unchanged. 
The difference lies in the net effect on profits of  the subsidized firm. 
Profits of the subsidized firm increase in this case. 
The question is: Is the countervailing duty of 10 percent in the two 
cases sufficient to deter subsidization? In the first case it is. It may not 
be sufficient in the second case, however. The reason is that although 
national  welfare  is decreased  to the same extent in  both cases, the 
profits of the subsidized firm are not the same. If the subsidizing gov- 345  Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies 
ernment looks more to the welfare of capital owners and employees 
of the subsidized firm, in order to maximize votes in the next election, 
it will not be deterred and stop subsidizing. Deterrence may therefore 
require a much higher countervailing tariff rate than the subsidy rate 
of 10 percent, and one sufficiently high to prevent any increase in firm 
profits. The author makes this point, but should have put more weight 
to it than to changes in national welfare. 
A tariff rate higher than 10 percent will, in my example, further raise 
the national welfare of the importing country and will also increase the 
profits of its import-competing firm at the expense of the subsidizing 
country. It is likely that constant-profit deterrence is less palatable to 
the subsidizing country than constant-national-welfare deterrence and 
is therefore more effective. It is also conceivable that it is perceived 
to be unfair because some profit shifting to the importing country takes 
place, and that it therefore is more likely to invoke retaliation on the 
part of the subsidizing country, in the case when deterrent action ac- 
tually takes place. 
Although constant-profit deterrence seems more likely to be effective 
than constant-national-welfare deterrence, it must be harder to apply 
in practice.  Subsidy rates are difficult to estimate, but probably less 
so than, ceteris paribus, the effect on profits of  subsidies. 
Perhaps the most important specific point made in the paper is that 
capital subsidies have very different effects depending on whether they 
result in additional capital investments or not, but that this is not taken 
into account in the way countervailing duty levels are actually com- 
puted. If capital subsidies result in no new capital, countervailing duty 
levels are too high, since they result in decreased exports by the sub- 
sidized firm. If  the capital subsidy  results in  new investments, they 
also tend to be too high, although the opposite is possible. My con- 
clusion after reading this section in the paper is that the relevant cir- 
cumstances have to be taken into account when the countervailing duty 
is set, i.e., one has to consider to what extent the capital subsidy results 
in additional capital. This Page Intentionally Left Blank